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RESPECT, CONTRACTUALISM, 
AND MORAL PROBLEMS 
JONAS VANDIEKEN 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis is concerned with respect as a fundamental moral notion, forms of Kantian 
contractualism as the most prominent contemporary moral theory being basically 
concerned with respect and problems of motivation and scope that are put forward against 
contractualist theories. The thesis aims to defend the contractualist theory of T.M. 
Scanlon against objections that are ultimately grounded in the acceptance of Humean 
theories of motivation. Consequently, the thesis is concerned with defending an 
alternative theory of motivation of the Kantian sort that can establish and secure the 
practicality and scope of contractualist theories. Furthermore, the thesis will elaborate on 
the nature of Kantian moral agency and its implications for moral theory. Ultimately, that 
should help vindicate respect as a fundamental moral notion and therefore the content as 
well as the authority of contractualist principles.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 The present thesis is concerned with respect, as a fundamental moral notion, with 
contractualism as the normative theory that forms the basis of contemporary discussions 
of respect, and with accompanying problems of motivation and content. Once we take 
respect to be a fundamental moral notion, what implications does it have for moral 
theory? I will defend the view that in answering this question we have to accept the 
normative implications of Kantian contractualist theories, such as those developed by 
John Rawls and T.M. Scanlon.1 While these theories can incorporate concern with 
respect, they seem to face serious problems with regard to their practicality and content-
justification. The goal of the thesis is to defend Kantian contractualism against objections 
of practicality and scope and hence vindicate contractualist theories as the appropriate 
normative theories, if we accept respect to be a fundamental moral notion. Significant 
parts of the thesis will be dedicated to the vindication of respect as the fundamental moral 
notion, insofar as persons usually conceive themselves to be autonomous agents, who can 
lay claims and demands on other persons. Eventually, I hope to be in a position to show 
that as rational agents we should ultimately be concerned to act on principles that mediate 
mutual respect among persons. This should further help us understand why a Humean 
theory of motivation is insufficient to render a plausible account of moral motivation 
which is based on respectful relations between persons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971)/ T.M. Scanlon, What 
We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1998). 
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The thesis proceeds as follows. I will begin by outlining arguments that should 
render plausible the idea that as persons we care about relationships that are built on 
respect. This should buttress the idea of respect being a fundamental moral notion. In a 
next step I will briefly outline Kantian contractualism, as the normative theory which can 
account for respect as a fundamental moral notion, before going on to present common 
objections stemming from concerns about the practicality and ultimately the content of 
Kantian contractualism. Following this, I will elaborate extensively on human agency and 
motivation in order to render plausible the idea that we can be motivated on the grounds 
of our rational capacities alone, without having to appeal to any present desires. After 
presenting arguments that defend a Kantian theory of motivation in favor of its Humean 
counterpart I will go on to elaborate what I shall term the content problem. I will develop 
arguments that show how we stand in relations of mutual accountability which should 
help justify the moral principles outlined by contractualism as the appropriate moral 
principles to guide conduct among persons. While briefly revisiting the Humean account 
of moral motivation in order to show that on such an account we cannot only not make 
sense of rational motivation, but also not make sense of moral obligation, I will conclude 
by arguing that the foregoing elaborations should vindicate the content and practicality 
and therefore the scope of contractualism. In addition the thesis should render plausible 
the idea that morality should be fundamentally concerned with respect. 
  
	  	  
3	  
Part I 
 
2. On Respect, The Experience of Disrespect and the Self-Respect 
of Persons 
 
“Appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human 
lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to 
destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them go well. 
Many of the most powerful of these reasons, however, are matters of respect 
and concern for the person whose life it is rather than of the respect for 
human life (per se)…”2 
 
 
It seems intuitively plausible to argue that we owe respect to each other as persons 
and it is this respect for each other that morality should at base be concerned with. What 
are the grounds for this assumption? Whatever they may be, they fundamentally concern 
personhood. Consequently, I will begin with certain concepts that I take to be 
fundamental of personhood, in order to render the idea of respect as a fundamental moral 
notion plausible.  
 
The Experience of Disrespect 
Let us begin with a first approximation of respect and why it seems so important. I 
will do so by appealing to an intuitively plausible phenomenon of personal experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, 104. My emphasis. 
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that should provide a first approximation of why morality should at base be concerned 
with respectful relations among persons.  
The phenomenon I am appealing to is the experience of disrespect. We experience 
disrespect or feel wronged if people act in accordance with reasons or principles that we 
find inappropriate or that we take to be simply disregarding of us. Imagine, someone 
steps on your foot and you urge him to take his foot off yours, because you are in pain. 
Now suppose the person does not take off his foot, but instead looks at you for a second 
and then turns away without fulfilling your demand. Everyone should be able to agree 
that in such situations we would feel wronged, and that part of this feeling stems from 
disrespect expressed by the other person. 
What we appeal to in a situation like this is that the other person does not take our 
point of view or our interests into consideration, although we know that he or she is able 
to do so. We feel that the other person is acting in ways that we cannot accept, because 
we take the other person to be responsible for his behavior. This is important to 
emphasize. Only insofar as we presuppose the other person to be responsible for his 
actions can we feel disrespected. When experiencing disrespect or being wronged by 
others, we appeal to the fact that certain reasons or principles – namely the principles the 
person who is standing on our foot is acting on – are unjustifiable to us or that we could 
reasonably reject them from our point of view and that the other person should recognize 
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this fact.3 Thus, we feel wronged if others do not take into consideration our standpoint 
and our reasons.  
 
 
Self-Respect 
Now, we can ask what grounds this experience of disrespect. In doing so, let me 
appeal to John Rawls’ influential discussion of self-respect. 4  In accordance with Rawls, I 
take it to be a fundamental feature of any person to possess a plan of life, something that 
this person is striving for. This includes being responsive to actions and behaviors of 
others, especially with regard to one’s own plans of life. Self-respect, as Rawls defines it, 
has two dimensions, namely a person’s sense of his or her own worth, a secure conviction 
that his or her plan of life is worth carrying out and confidence in one’s ability to fulfill 
one’s plans.5  These considerations seem to imply a fundamental moral notion underlying 
self-respect, namely the notion of equal moral status of a person among others to each of 
whom equal consideration is owed. 6 This furthermore entails a “deep psychological truth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This notion of wrongness is developed by T.M. Scanlon as part of his contractualist theory. See Scanlon, 
What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA 1998. 
4 See Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice. 
5 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 440. 
6 “Self-respect is strongly connected with self-esteem and social recognition in the sense that we need the 
validation of others to continue having faith in our own abilities and endeavors.” See Catherine Audard, 
John Rawls (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press 2007), 108. 
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about the conditions for personal self-realization, namely that it is dependent upon mutual 
interaction and appreciation by others.”7 Hence, Rawls states in A Theory: 
 
“Now our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others. Unless we feel that 
our endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the 
conviction that our ends are worth advancing.”8  
  
Although we can easily think of exceptions, I assume for the sake of the present 
thesis, that every person considers his or her own life to be important and valuable. Thus, 
I assume that every person possesses self-respect. If this is the case, we can infer that 
every person A expects every other person B to accept the life of person A as valuable as 
his or her own life. If person B does not take person A’s life to be valuable, person A can 
experience disrespect, to put things in very general terms.  
What these very brief elaborations should point out is that persons have (1) 
individual plans of life as well as (2) a capacity to demand acknowledgment of claims 
from others. If we take this to be a plausible characterization of persons, we can argue 
that any “conditions that undermine self-respect” must be avoided.9 Thus, Rawls argues 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Thomas Baldwin, Rawls and Moral Psychology, in: Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, Volume 3 (New York: Oxford University Press 2008), 247-270, 255. 
8 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 178. 
9 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 440. 
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“Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we 
lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and 
we sink into apathy and cynicism.”10 
 
We should therefore be able to accept what Rawls famously termed the 
‘separateness of persons.’ The idea behind the ‘separateness of persons’ is that we have 
to acknowledge that every person has a unique life to live. This entails the idea of each 
person being able to separately determine his or her own plan of life, which includes the 
capacity to expect one’s plans of life and accompanying reasons to be respected by other 
persons. Consequently, moral principles that can incorporate this idea are of a special 
kind, as we shall see later on.11  
 
Self-Respect, The Experience of Disrespect, and its Implications 
Granting these two brief elaborations on characteristic features of persons, we can 
now consider its implications. If we accept the fact that persons possess self-respect, 
which makes them subject to possible experiences of disrespect, and furthermore accept 
the fact that as persons they are embedded in a community among other persons, we can 
ask how persons should or ought to relate to each other.  
Insofar we accept Rawls’s premise that a our self-respect is of essential importance 
in order for us to autonomously carry out plans of life and hence be able to live a 
meaningful life, it becomes clear why mutual respect is a desirable condition to hold 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Rawls, A Theory of Justice5, 440. 
11  Elizabeth Ashford, and Tim Mulgan, Contractualism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (last 
modified August 2nd 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/. 
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among persons.12 Therefore, we should be able to grasp why it seems reasonable to hold 
that we ought to relate to each other in a way that acknowledges each person’s unique life 
and thus supports each person’s self-respect. To put it simply; we ought to relate to each 
other by respecting each other. 
 
What does the concept of respect refer to? Respect refers to the idea that we must 
act in such a way that our actions and the reasons thereof take each other’s point of view 
into consideration. Respecting a person means to take into considerations the reasons 
another person might have in a given situation and implementing them in one’s decision 
making. The kind of respect we are concerned with here is then a form of moral 
recognition respect. 13  Moral recognition respect “consists in giving appropriate 
consideration to some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do.”14 Since 
persons can be the objects of deliberation, as I will show in the later parts of the thesis, 
we have to recognize the other person as putting certain limits on our actions or choices. 
To treat someone with respect means to ‘step back’, to assess and evaluate our own 
motives and reasons in light of the other person and her interests.  
As we can see, respect, understood as an attitude, entails the notion of an 
evaluative stance that a person must adopt. To respect another means to form evaluative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “An autonomous person is a free person in a special sense: he or she is capable of determining him or 
herself both in thought and action.” Terry Pinkard, Democratic Liberalism and Social Union (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press 1987), 5. Such a notion of personal autonomy seems to be comprised in the first 
part of Rawls’s concept of moral personality, namely having an individual conception of the good. 
13 For a detailed account of recognition respect and its alternatives, see various works of Stephen Darwall. 
See, Stephen Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, in: Ethics, Vol.88, No.1 (Oct.1977), 36-49 and Stephen 
Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2006). 
14 Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 38. My emphasis. 
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judgments in the light of impartial or other-regarding reasons, or so the thesis will argue 
in the following. In order to do so, one must be able to recognize certain impartially valid 
principles. It is principles of this kind that mediate respectful relations among persons. To 
respect people then means to treat them only in ways to which they could consent, agree 
or which they could not reasonably reject.15 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Whereas the notion of consent seems to stem from Kant’s Formula of Humanity, the notion of agreement 
refers to Rawls’ Original Position, while the idea of reasonable rejection grounds Scanlon’s 
contractualism. 
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3. Mutual Respect and Normative Theory 
  This is what the Kantian contractualism of John Rawls and T.M. Scanlon 
ultimately appeals to, the latter of which I will briefly outline in the following section: 
 
“…to recognize human life as valuable (to respect it) is, first and foremost, to see the 
reasons we have for treating others in ways that accord with principles that they 
could not reasonably reject.”16 
 
Principles that cannot be reasonably rejected are those which are justified on the grounds 
of mutual recognition. These are principles that are justified with regard to the reasons of 
every person, who could otherwise reject these principles. Therefore, contractualism 
grounds respect in the condition of mutual justifiability of principles upon whom a person 
can act.   
Accordingly, an act is right if it is grounded in a principle that is justified and hence 
not subject to reasonable rejection.17 Therefore, moral rightness and wrongness and 
accompanying principles are not defined independently of relations among persons, but 
originate within such relations. What is right and wrong depends on its justifiability. 
Consequently, Scanlon argues that 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 8. 
17 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 218. 
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“…an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed 
by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”18 
 
Moral principles do not exist independently of personal relations. They evolve out 
of an interpersonal process. Interpersonal relations are the sources of normativity, so to 
speak. This distinguishes Kantian Contractualism from other normative theories, insofar 
as moral principles are grounded in relationships of mutual respect. 19  Thus, 
contractualism relates to the idea of social contract theory, as it attempts to derive the 
content of morality from agreement between all its members. It is its concern with 
agreement or reasonably rejection that furthermore distinguishes Kantian Contractualism 
from other versions of contractualism, such as Hobbes’s, with the latter being “based on 
mutual self-interest.”20 
Consequently, we cannot judge an act to be right or wrong without appealing to the 
justifiableness of its underlying principles to every person. If we understand respect to be 
constituted by principles that cannot be reasonably rejected, we can understand how 
respect constitutes moral rightness, whereas disrespect constitutes moral wrongness. 
Accordingly, Scanlon delineates the contractualist idea as follows: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Scanlon; What We Owe to Each Other, 153. 
19 “It is a hallmark of contractualist theories that they hold principles of right to have a distinctive role, 
namely, as mediating relations of mutual respect.” Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, Cambridge, 
301. 
20  For an outline of contractualism in contemporary moral theory, see Ashford, and Mulgan, 
Contractualism. 
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“The contractualist ideal of acting in accord with principles that others (similarly 
motivated) could not reasonably reject is meant to characterize the relation with 
others the value and appeal of which underlies our reasons to do what morality 
requires. This relation, much less personal than friendship, might be called a relation 
of mutual recognition.”21 
 
The main idea behind Scanlon’s contractualism is that of an equal standing or authority to 
demand justification from as well as to give justification to one another. This is what 
Scanlon refers to in his theory as “mutual recognition.” It ultimately entails the idea that 
in order to respect one another, that is in order to recognize another’s authority, we have 
to respond to the reasons of the other and incorporate them into our reasoning and 
eventually into our motives. We have to evaluate our reasons in the light of the reasons of 
another or in the light of second-personal reasons.22 On the contractualist theory outlined 
here, we do so by appealing to principles no one could reasonably reject and that are 
consequently justified. To put it differently, we have to be able to recognize certain 
normative reasons that are grounded in the relationships of mutual respect. What 
therefore motivates one to act in accordance with certain principles that no one could 
reasonably reject is the capacity to recognize reasons and form judgments based on 
relationships of mutual recognition.  
Furthermore, it should become clear that contractualism is able to incorporate 
concern for self-respect and the experience of disrespect, insofar as contractualism takes 
these personal features as determining the content and validity of its principles. On the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 162. My emphasis. 
22 I am borrowing this term from Stephen Darwall. See Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint. 
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contractualist account outlined above, certain principles are objectionable on the grounds 
of personal experience of disrespect on the one hand and vindicated by supporting a 
person’s self-respect on the other hand. Only if a principle can be justified to others, and 
thereby acknowledge and support the other persons’ self-respect, is the principle a 
morally legitimate principle. 
  
	  	  
14	  
4. Contractualism and Moral Problems 
It has been objected that only people committed to the value of mutual recognition 
will act in accordance with the contractualist principles.23 On several occasions, even 
Scanlon himself seems to indicate that the moral principles he proposes apply only to 
people who are “suitably motivated,”24 or “similarly motivated.” From this qualification, 
critics tend to infer that only persons with a commitment to the contractualist ideals will 
adhere to such principles. Persons who simply lack this commitment or desire – those 
who Gerald Dworkin calls the “disaffected” – cannot grasp the “motivational force” of 
contractualist principles. 25  Therefore, the scope of the authority of contractualist 
principles seems to be very limited. Hence, the problem of scope. 
  
In accordance with Scanlon, I would like to argue that such objections are 
mistaken. Contractualist principles do not have a limited scope with regard to its 
authority. Rather, the problem of scope evolves itself on the basis of a questionable 
concept of moral motivation, or so I argue. What is implicit in the criticisms of the 
authority of contractualism is, I content, the acceptance of a noncognitivist or Humean 
theory of motivation. According to this account, which is prevalent among meta-ethicists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Philip Cook, Kantian Constructivism and Transcendental Arguments,  
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228538711_Kantian_Constructivism_and_Transcendental_Argum
ents_Rawls_Scanlon_and_Strawson_on_Justification, 2. Cook calls it the “objection from scope.” 
24 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 189. 
25 Gerald Dworkin, Contractualism and the Normativity of Principles, in: Ethics, Vol.112, No.3 (April 
2002), 471-482, 482. 
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concerned with the “moral problem,”26 mere responsiveness to reasons won’t motivate 
you to act accordingly. To be moved to act on certain reasons, one must possess 
accompanying desires or pro-attitudes.  
These critics question the cognitivist premise that any moral theory that is 
fundamentally concerned with respect among persons has to accept, namely that we as 
human beings have the capacity to ‘grasp’ or recognize other-regarding or categorical 
reasons and are as such able to respond to these reasons accordingly, without any appeal 
to desire – and that this is all we need to constitute any motivation. According to these 
critics, this premise sounds illusory, because it seems implausible to get any valid account 
of motivation without appeal to desires or feelings. These critics argue that although we 
can judge an action to be morally right or wrong, this judgment alone does not motivate 
us to act accordingly. They defend the Humean doctrine that “reason alone can never be a 
motive to any action of the will.”27 Hence, the moral problem. 
 
1. Moral judgments like (A) ‘It is right to act only on principles that cannot be 
reasonably rejected’ express a person’s practical belief about what it is right to do. 
2. Moral judgments like (A) motivate one to do (A). 
3. Motivation entails the existence of desires, which are distinct – not cognitively 
connected to – from beliefs.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 I borrow this term from Michael Smith. See Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell 
1994). 
27 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978), 
413. 
28 See Smith, The Moral Problem, 12. 
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The critics of the scope of contractualism seem to accept (3) as a fundamental 
aspect of motivation. According to these noncognitivists, (1) and (2) do not suffice to 
present us with a positive account of motivation. From this follows, the critics claim, that 
contractualist theories lack authority and are thus limited in scope. 
  
Scanlon, however, makes it pretty clear that there is no such problem of moral 
motivation and hence no problem of scope, insofar as they are connected. Let me explain 
Scanlon’s claim in the following. How could we make sense of the experience of 
disrespect, which is grounded in self-respect, if we cannot appeal to the motivational 
efficaciousness of some interpersonal reasons? In the cases where we experience 
disrespect on the basis of unjustifiable principles, we do so because we feel that the 
person who disrespected us should have recognized the force of certain reasons than 
others. We feel disrespected, because the other person acted in a way that denies our 
“standing to (partly) determine the terms on which we each shall live”29 and hence our 
self-respect by not responding to our reasons. It does not seem as though we presuppose a 
commitment to certain principles in the other person without which he or she would not 
be blameworthy. From this it follows that we will not think it plausible that a person must 
first exhibit a certain desire in order to be able to act in accordance with certain 
principles. Quite contrary, we usually take people to be able to act on principles that are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Pamela Hieronymi, Of Metaethics and Motivation, in: R. Jay Wallace, and Rahul Kumar, and Samuel 
Freeman, (ed.), Reasons and Recognition, Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2011), 101-128, 108. 
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independent of their desires or interests and as such able to take impartial reasons into 
account. For this reason, Scanlon argues 
 
“We all believe that some actions are morally wrong. But when we claim that 
an action is wrong, what kind of judgment are we making? Judgments about 
right and wrong cannot be straightforwardly understood as factual claims 
about the empirical world or about our own psychology. Yet they do seem to 
make claims about some subject matter, claims which are capable of being 
true or false. Moreover, while certain kinds of experience can be important in 
putting us in a position to make moral judgments, making these judgments 
themselves does not seem to be a matter of observation. Rather, we arrive at 
the judgment that a certain kind of action would be wrong simply by thinking 
about the questions in the right way, sometimes through a process of careful 
assessment that it is natural to call it a kind of reasoning. But what kind of 
reasoning is it? Finally, the fact that a certain action would be morally wrong 
seems to provide a powerful reason not to do it, one that is, at least normally, 
decisive against nay competing consideration.”30  
 
Implicit in this line of thought is the idea that persons are responsive to certain 
reasons that should be able to move them without appeal to preexisting desires. We 
ascribe persons a cognitive capacity to form certain evaluative judgments upon which 
they can consequently act. In the case of the person standing on my foot, we simply 
ascribe this person responsiveness to certain external reasons that alone should be 
motivationally efficacious. After all, persons qua rational beings are “reasoning 
creature(s)” who have the “capacity to recognize, assess, and be moved by reasons.”31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 1. 
31 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 23. 
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This is a major premise of the thesis I aim to defend further in the following. As such, 
persons are always faced with the normative question ‘What ought I to do?’, not merely 
with the question ‘What do I want to do?`. Hence, we have to defend the Kantian idea of 
the priority of a deliberative standpoint. Otherwise, we cannot make sense of the practical 
necessity of moral requirements of right and wrong. 
 In the following section I will lay out an argument that will help to buttress 
Scanlon’s claims and therefore undermine any objections with regard to the motivational 
efficacy of contractualist moral principles. Eventually, I will explain how the moral 
problem ceases to exist, by attempting to show that (3) is not a necessary constituent of 
moral motivation. There is then no further problem of moral motivation besides the 
cognition of certain normative principles.32 Whereas a cognitivist account of moral 
motivation can eventually account for the fact that moral judgments suffice to motivate 
one to act accordingly, we still have to show that the contractualist moral principles are 
the appropriate moral principles. This means we have to furthermore present an argument 
against moral skeptics or those who question the validity of the specific contractualist 
principles. In this spirit, Scanlon asks 
 
“Why should we give considerations of right and wrong, whatever they are this kind 
of priority over our other concerns and over other values?”33 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Scanlon argues, “…the problem of explaining moral motivation…is misleading in two important 
respects…it suggests that the problem in question is one of understanding how people are motivated rather 
than of understanding the reasons they have. As I explained… I hold that the question of reasons is primary 
and that once the relevant reasons are understood there is no separate problem of motivation.” Scanlon, 
What We Owe to Each Other, 147. 
33 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 1. 
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Although I believe that my brief elaborations on the experience of disrespect as 
well as the significance of self-respect can foreshadow an answer to this question, we 
need to support these assumptions further by elaborating on the nature of our rational 
agency and its implications. What needs to be done in the following is to present a 
plausible account of what Darwall calls “second-person standpoint”34 in order to see why 
contractualist principles are the appropriate moral principles for persons.35 This seems to 
be the real moral problem; it is one of the justification of content and not of motivation.36  
 
Hence, I will defend not only the view that we can be motivated by reason alone, 
on the grounds of evaluative judgments, but also that our nature as self-conscious rational 
beings puts us in relations to each other that have normative significance for our practical 
judgments. This should further help to vindicate the idea of respect being a fundamental 
moral notion and contractualism the appropriate normative theory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 13. 
35 “Kant’s argument is roughly this: if morality binds with practical necessity, it cannot work through the 
passive desires described by an empiricist account of motivation. They must possess the capacity to be 
moved by principle (or by a conception of the good). A satisfactory grasp of the possibility of morality 
requires a revision of our understanding of agency.” See, Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993), viii. 
36 Eventually it should become obvious that the problem of motivation actually reduces to the problem of 
content. Or to put it differently, a solution to the content problem will actually further solve the problem of 
motivation, insofar as motivation depends on the recognition of the right reasons. See Hieronymi, Of 
Metaethics and Motivation, 109.	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Part II  
 
5. Human Agency and Motivation 
In the following section, I aim to outline an account of moral motivation that 
originates from within reason in order to vindicate the contractualist approach to 
motivation, before going on to focus on the problem of content. I will begin by briefly 
outlining a Humean account of motivation and its implications. Then, I will contrast the 
Humean account with a Kantian conception of motivation, broadly conceived. I will 
present arguments that support such an account on the grounds of a more accurate picture 
of rational agency than the one we arrive at on the Humean account. This section has, 
however, also a second aim. While its primary purpose is to render plausible an account 
of reason-based motivation, its secondary purpose is to show what the attitude of respect 
entails; not acting on first-personal desires and reasons, but on evaluative judgments that 
are grounded in impartial reasons and principles.37  
 
Humean Moral Motivation 
 First of all, let us look at what I call a ‘classical Humean version of moral 
motivation’. According to the classical argument of Hume,38 a version of which has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This is in accordance with Scanlon, according to whom respect belongs to a class of judgment-sensitive 
attitudes. Thus, he states “Hunger is obviously not a judgment-sensitive-attitude; but belief is and so 
are…respect, and other evaluative attitudes…”, see Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 20, my 
emphasis. 
38 See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. 
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most famously defended by Bernard Williams,39 what ultimately motivates us to act in 
accordance with some reason is a desire, not a belief. A belief is itself never sufficient to 
motivate. Accordingly, Hume states “…reason alone can never produce any action.”40 
Why is this so? 
 Belief and desire are distinct entities. Beliefs can be assessed “in terms of truth 
and falsehood”, but desires “are not subject to any rational criticism at all,” because they 
are some kind of original and independent entities with no reference to reason.41 Reason’s 
function, according to Hume, comprises such features as abstract reasoning, inferring and 
judging and as such can never influence our will, but can only help to achieve an end that 
we already have. Reason is “wholly inactive.”42 What on the other hand motivates us to 
act is a passion, a feeling, such as a desire or a fear.43  
Desires are “unreflective elements of our practical thinking” that “‘assail us’ 
unbidden,” such as the sudden desire for cold water.44 As such, desires are simply given 
and as such part of our sentient constitution and cannot be assessed like discursive beliefs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 B.O.A. Williams, Internal and External Reasons, in: Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action (New York: 
Cambridge University Press 1979). 
40	  Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 414. 
41 Smith, The Moral Problem, 8. Accordingly, Hume states that “Reason is the discovery of truth or 
falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, 
or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or 
disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now ‘tis evident 
our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being 
original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, 
and actions. ‘Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be contrary or 
conformable to reason.” Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 458. 
42 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 458. 
43 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 414-415. 
44 R. Jay Wallace, Scanlon’s Contractualism, in: Ethics, Vol. 112, No.3, Symposium on Scanlon’s ‘What 
We Owe to Each Other’ (April 2002), 429-470, 441. 
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can.45 They are, on the classical account, non-evaluative psychological states that are 
contingent upon the constitution of its bearer, so to speak.46  What makes desires 
motivationally efficacious is that desires inherently aim at the satisfaction of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain. As such, desires are deeply first-personal; they express personal 
interests or preferences and are consequently structurally self-interested, because they are 
ultimately constituted by individual anticipations of well-being. 
To be more specific, a desire exemplifies a psychological pro-attitude or a strong 
feeling towards acting in such and such a way without which no one could be moved to 
act. Sarah Buss summarizes these points as following: “Desires are mental states that 
dispose the agent to act in certain ways, given certain non-evaluative beliefs.”47 Now, to 
some it might seem mistaken to ascribe such a view to proponents of a Humean theory of 
motivation. After all, a desire to buy a Mercedes Benz and not a BMW depends on some 
kind of evaluation. There must be some thought process going on that allows a person to 
decide whether to buy a Mercedes Benz or a BMW. So, on the Humean view one can 
obviously think about his or her intentions or implications of certain reasons. But, to infer 
from this example that on the Humean view a decision depends primarily on an 
evaluative belief seems to me to be mistaken. It does so on the grounds of the nature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “But the basic assumption of Humean views is that, for each person A, there is a set of primary desires he 
has at any time t, which are given to him by his nature and circumstances, and which provide the necessary 
basis for his having any reason for acting.” Samuel Freeman, Contractualism, Moral Motivation, and 
Practical Reason, in: Journal of Philosophy 1991, 281-303, 290. 
46 Note that points out that a Humean Theory of Reasons does not necessarily have to appeal to desires, but 
any kind of psychological state that an individual might bear. See Mark Schroeder, Slave of the Passions 
(New York: Oxford University Press 2007), 9. 
47 Sarah Buss, What practical reasoning must be if we act for our own reasons, in: Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 77:4, 399-421, 402.  
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evaluative beliefs. An evaluative belief is constituted by judgments which are in turn 
based on the recognition of reasons that are independent of one’s desires. I will 
eventually come back to this later in the thesis, but let me very briefly expound the main 
idea here. To evaluate means to think, to “bring forth representations oneself,”48 and 
hence actively engage in the enterprise of evaluation.49 If evaluative beliefs would be 
constituted on the grounds of desires, these beliefs would not be the product of our 
thinking but merely the effects of some contingent desires. The representations would 
already be given. The latter is exactly what we get on the Humean picture. One might 
believe that buying a Mercedes Benz is better for many reasons, but the relevant reasons 
are not the product of judgments at the level of thinking, but merely the effects of one’s 
desires. Consequently, it is not really one’s own thought out decision to buy the Mercedes 
Benz, but a determinate result of one’s desire. No evaluative belief B, in the way I 
circumscribed it, plays a role in ultimately motivating us to act. Only an accompanying 
desire can motivate me to act on my belief B. Eventually, we should be able to make 
sense of the idea that an “agent's desire to do A is distinct from her judgment that it is 
desirable to do A.”50   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith (ed.) (New York: Palgrave McMillan 2007), B75. 
See also Engstrom’s detailed examination of Kant’s account of thinking and judging. See Stephen 
Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge, A Study of the Categorical Imperative (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press 2009), 100. 
49 See also, Buss, What practical reasoning must be if we act for our own reasons, 413. 
50 Buss, What practical reasoning must be if we act for our own reasons, 402. 
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Therefore, reason, insofar as it is the source only of judgments and beliefs, is the 
“slave of the passions,” or so the argument goes.51 Reasons (for), insofar as they signify 
motivating reasons, are desire-dependent.52 For one to have a reason to do something, the 
act of doing it must advance the satisfaction of a present desire. Without it, one has no 
good reason for doing something, or so it seems. 
On the classical Humean version of motivation, it seems as though the non-
evaluative component, namely the desire, always trumps the evaluative capacities persons 
possess. This is highly problematic, if we want to make sense of respectful relations 
among persons that are clearly not constituted solely by self-interested individuals. 
 
Without getting into too many details here, it should be clear that on such an 
account, motivation to act in accordance with some reason comes down to contingent 
desires that are part of the one’s motivational set and which might differ considerably 
from one person to another. According to this view, people would not necessarily be open 
to take impartial reasons as being of any motivational significance. On the classical 
Humean account, morality therefore does not possess a categorical nature, because it’s 
authority depends exclusively on the kinds of non-cognitive desires one has. Quite the 
contrary, on such an account morality possesses merely hypothetical nature.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 415. 
52 I borrow this term from Mark Schroeder. See Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, vi. 
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As such the classical argument calls into question the “objective prescriptivity of 
morality.”53 Hence, the problem for contractualism. For morality to be objectively 
prescriptive, it has to entail the existence of motivationally efficacious general reasons 
that can be “reasons for absolutely anyone.”54 But as the classical Humean argument 
seems to show, such reasons do not exist, insofar as reasons for someone to do something 
“must always be explained by some psychological feature of that agent.”55 On the 
classical Humean account, one could exhibit morally relevant evaluative dispositions, one 
could have altruistic desires, but one does not necessarily have to have such dispositions. 
It is simply a matter of one’s background conditions, if a person is susceptible to specific 
moral demands. Furthermore, we cannot hold someone responsible, if this person is 
simply missing the relevant psychological constitution.56 
We might find some objective values on the Humean account, such as shared 
values of a specific community. But that these values transcend certain contexts and 
hence apply to everyone is not guaranteed on such an account. Hence I agree with Karl 
Ameriks who argues that “Although…Humean theories can account for a kind of 
objectivity for moral beliefs that arise in convergence of natural desires, there is no 
ground…for expecting that these ‘objective’ values must provide any common standards 
for all agents.” There simply is “no intelligible ground for any necessary overarching 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 8. 
54 Schroeder, Slaves of Passions, 8. 
55 Schroeder, Slaves of Passions, 8. 
56 “Altruistic or benevolent desires on the other hand seem less common. In neither case are we in any 
sense required to possess the desires in question: consequently we are not required to act on the specified 
considerations. If one lacks the relevant desire, there is nothing more to be said.” Thomas Nagel, The 
Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 28. 
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agreement on values even in principle.” 57 The idea behind Ameriks claims is that on the 
Humean account so called objective standards depends on preexisting desires and values 
that might very significantly. On the Humean account, moral beliefs, like other beliefs, 
depend on desires as their source. Beliefs are hence mere results of desires as I pointed 
out before, or as Ameriks claims mere “reflexes.” 58  From this it is easy to infer that one 
who lacks the relevant desires is not susceptible to certain moral beliefs. All this, seems 
to be rather implausible with regard to the nature of beliefs and the grip they have on us. I 
will return to this very last point later on. 
And even if a person possesses the relevant desire to adhere to moral requirements, 
this desire does not necessarily trump his other desires. Rather, the so called ‘moral 
desire’ is put on par with other desires, which can in any given situation override the 
moral desire. Samuel Freeman neatly sums this up: “On the Humean account, it would be 
irrational to assign moral motives, and the reasons they provide, any greater weight than 
their present strength allows.”59 We should be able to grasp that if desires are the source 
of moral beliefs, it creates all kinds of problems for a moral theory that is at base 
concerned with the reason-giving force of objective moral standards. In order to secure 
the objective prescriptivity of morality, we must be able to vindicate the reason-giving 
force of universal reasons that can apply to anyone at any time.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Karl Ameriks, Kant and Motivational Externalism, in: Heiner F Klemme, and Manfred Kuehn, and 
Dieter Schoenecker (eds.), Moralische Motivation, Kant und die Alternativen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag 2006), 3-22,16. My emphasis. 
58 Ameriks points out that on the Humean account, “one must hold the remarkable claim that adult human 
beliefs are mere reflexes, as if the mere feeling of pain, which has no semantic complexity in itself, 
somehow (but how?) necessitates the formation of the complex thought ‘pain is bad`.” See Ameriks, Kant 
and Motivational Externalism, 12. 
59 Freeman, Contractualism, 294. 
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Reason and Motivation 
First of all, let us briefly reconsider the implications of the classical Humean 
account outlined above. On such a view we cannot appeal to objective moral principles. 
There is at best a weak sense of moral objectivity. Furthermore, it seems that according to 
this account we cannot expect to demand a certain conduct from other people, since they 
could simply lack the necessary desire. We would not be able to appeal to their moral 
conscience and could not ascribe them any morally relevant responsibility for their 
actions. A further consequence of great importance for this thesis is that persons are not 
responsive to objective reasons independently of their desires. Therefore, persons are 
consequently not necessarily responsive to others, because only motivationally 
efficacious awareness of certain impartial reasons can account for this mutual 
responsiveness. Whether or not a person expresses a respectful attitude depends on his or 
her predominant desires. All this renders a highly implausible picture of a rational person 
as a moral agent. Respectful relations would be something contingent and could never be 
demanded on reasonable grounds. 
What a Humean account of moral motivation nevertheless does do for us is to 
make us sensitive of the problem it claims to solve, namely how our actions are 
motivated. It puts an emphasis on the practical aspect of morality, but its solution does no 
justice to the requirement of moral objectivity. What we need to do then is to explore an 
alternative to the Humean account of motivation that can incorporate objective moral 
principles. 
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This being said, we do not have to give up the motivational role of desires as 
stated above. What, however, we have to give up is the idea that desires are not rationally 
assessable and are merely unreflective psychological states. On the theory I am going to 
defend, moral motivation is based in reason. We have to arrive at a picture on which 
desires depend on independently accepted norms or principles which are not empirical 
and do not rest on prior desires. Furthermore, this will provide a much more plausible 
account of agency we usually ascribe to persons. 
 
In what follows I will contest the classical Humean view of moral motivation, 
since it does no justice to the idea that we can be motivated by reason alone and hence 
have certain categorical obligations to others, a view that seems rather implausible to me. 
Hence, I will defend the view that we can and must indeed be motivated by reason alone. 
My arguments will render plausible the idea that we can act from objective principles and 
hence be responsive to others in the relevant sense. It should further help us to vindicate 
the idea of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, as a reasonable requirement for action that 
applies to us independently of our desires, interests or preferences and therefore 
unconditionally. In order to accomplish this I will present an account of deliberative 
agency that can render plausible the concept of intentional action by focusing on the 
reason-giving force of practical judgments that constitutes rational- and eventually moral 
agency. We should be able to arrive at a more satisfying, because more accurate, picture 
of rational agency that incorporates the activity of practical deliberation, and therefore 
autonomy – “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself independently of any 
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property of the objects of volition”60 as well as the accompanying concepts of choice and 
responsibility that we usually ascribe to rational agents. 
 
Rational Agency – Dismantling the Role of Desires  
 First of all, it is important that we reject the idea that our actions are ultimately 
caused by some brute desires that nature has provided us with. Let us consider some basic 
assumptions. Human beings qua rational agents are self-conscious thinking beings. It is 
through our inferential thinking and use of reflective capacities that we determine what to 
do. Our actions are motivated by evaluative judgments and beliefs we make as part of a 
deliberative process, or so I will argue in this section. Persons qua practical agents are 
always faced with the normative question of what they should or ought to do and how 
they should or ought to do it. Similarly, rational agents qua believers face the question of 
what to believe and on what grounds to believe. Therefore, a rational agent always 
decides on some ground what she ought to believe or what she ought to do. A rational 
agent does so actively and not passively, merely on the basis of natural desires. A person 
who stands in front of the White House will believe to be standing in front of the White 
House and not in front of the Eiffel Tower, although the person might actually desire to 
believe to be standing in front of the Eiffel Tower. In any case, it should eventually 
become clear that rational agents are able to deliberately self-direct instead of being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor (ed.)(New York: Cambridge University 
Press 1997), 4:440. 
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forced to act by some desire they have no control over.61 Persons are after all able to act 
for reasons “all the way down,” as Barbara Herman puts it.62 This is what it means for a 
person to be an autonomous agent. 
To buttress these ideas, let us think about the way we usually ascribe 
responsibility to a person for her decisions and actions. We do so, because we take 
ourselves and other persons to actively chose or will to act on a certain reason and not 
another. We view persons to be free, not determined by natural laws, and hence able to 
actively determine themselves. Accordingly, I think that I – implying a self-conscious, 
autonomous agent, capable of making judgments that determine my action – intended to 
come to the café across the street to drink a coffee and work on my thesis. I also think 
that I could have done otherwise. I could have chosen to stay in the library, but I decided 
not to. It is this sense of responsibility that we should ascribe to any rational agent. Since 
I had a desire for coffee, I chose to go to the café and drink a coffee, instead of staying in 
the library. I made a decision that led to my action which in turn ultimately satisfied my 
desire. 
Therefore, I will argue in the following that we have to revise the Humean picture, 
which holds that our actions are intentional as long as they are caused by some desire. 
Quite contrary, the following should help render plausible the idea that our intentions – 
which ultimately motivate us to act – are grounded in our deliberative agency that 
operates independently of any desires. Deliberation, the following will argue, is not a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Buss, What Practical Reasoning Must Be, 399. 
62 “Indeed, the capacity to act for reasons all the way down is defining rational agency.” See, Herman, The 
Practice of Moral Judgment, 228. 
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passive process that just happens within a person, but a process that is actively directed 
by the agent.63  Therefore, it should become clear that the activity of deliberating and 
actively forming an intention is constitutive of any agent.  
This is not to say that we never act on impulses and feeling, such as when we are 
craving for coffee. But even when we act from a desire, it seems highly unlikely that we 
actually act completely ‘driven’ or unreflective, without any awareness of the grounds of 
our desire and without appealing to our rationality in order to actually satisfy the desire. 
The following aims to present, in steps, arguments that render the aforementioned ideas 
of rational agency as motivationally efficacious appropriate. 
 
Kantian Agency and the Importance of Evaluative Judgments 
In this section I intend to make a first step towards the idea that a person is 
ultimately motivated to act by his or her evaluative judgment. Let me try to explain this 
by referring to important ideas from Kant as well as influential contemporary 
philosophers. According to Kant, we are rational beings with a will, whose actions 
always aim at some goal or end. Those ends or goals can entail the satisfaction of a 
desire, such as thirst, or the goal of becoming the next president. In any case, in order to 
reach our goal, we have to adopt some principle or subjective rule to act upon, what Kant 
calls a maxim. The desire itself does not tell us how to satisfy itself, so to speak. We have 
to decide how to best reach our goal. This is done through the will, insofar as the will is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Sidney Shoemaker, On Knowing One’s Own Mind, in: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology 
(1988), 183-209, 186. 
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“determining one’s practical faculty to seek an end.”64 Accordingly, if we presuppose the 
idea of a will, we can infer that even desires based on empirical impulses do not directly 
cause an action, but rather provide us with an incentive to set a certain end and to adopt a 
maxim which expresses the end.  
Let us see how this might work in the case of thirst and my desire to quench the 
thirst.65 We can grant that thirst is a natural desire that simply arises in us. First, consider 
a little prelude to the main argument that should get us in the right direction and which I 
will pick up in the following section. When someone asks me why I sprinted to the 
vending machine to buy a soft drink, I will respond by citing my thirst as a reason for my 
action. Hence, the thirst-quenching desire figures as an explanatory reason that I can 
offer; it enters the space of reasons, so to speak, and thereby becomes intelligible to other 
rational beings. Accordingly, I myself must be aware of and evaluate or judge thirst to be 
the cause of my thirst-quenching desire and to be a good reason for me to sprint to the 
vending machine to get a soft drink. This undermines the idea that we are merely driven 
by unreflective desires.  
Granted that my thirst, as a natural desire, gets my thinking going, so to speak, I 
will consider further arguments against the primacy of desires as sources for our 
motivation, according to which my action of going to the vending machine and buying a 
soft drink is not motivated by my thirst alone. What is important to emphasize is that my 
action is based on a practical norm that I adopt in order to achieve my goal of getting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press 1999), 53. 
65 The example of thirst figures prominently in Thomas Nagel’s influential discussion of desires and 
motivation.  See Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism, 33-34. 
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soft drink. Whereas the desire only sets the end of getting a drink, it does not motivate the 
action of buying a drink, which actually satisfies my thirst-quenching desire, as Thomas 
Nagel is right to point out.66 What motivates the action of buying a drink is the adoption 
of a practical norm upon which I ought to act in order for me to satisfy my thirst-
quenching desire.  
Let us consider the example again. I, as a self-conscious thinking being, judge that 
the goal of quenching my thirst is good for me and hence I deliberate about what maxim 
to adopt in order to reach that goal. I ask myself: ‘What ought I to do in order to quench 
my thirst?’ I evaluate the situation according to my goal and adopt a normative principle 
– a plan – on the grounds of which I act in order to reach my goal. Consequently my 
thirst gives rise to a deliberative process at the end of which I adopt the maxim which 
tells me to run the vending machine and buy a drink. 67 The adoption of the principle 
upon which to act is itself grounded in a judgment, never in a desire. Let us think about it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 “Upon reflection, it can seem mysterious that thirst should be capable of motivating someone not just to 
drink, but to put a dime in a slot. Thirst by itself does not motivate such technical undertaking…I think it is 
very important to resist the temptation to close this gap by expanding the original desire for drink, or by 
adding another desire. It is of course true that when one sees that the only way to get a drink is to put a 
dime in the slot, one then wants to put a dime in the slot. But that is what requires explanation: it is a desire 
motivated by thirst plus certain information. If we simply add it on as a further motive, we shall not do 
justice to its peculiar appropriateness; for any arbitrary desire might be added in that capacity. For 
example, its is imaginable that thirst should cause me to want to put a dime in my pencil sharpener, but this 
would be an obscure compulsion or the product of malicious conditioning, rather than a rational motivation. 
We should not say that thirst provided me with a reason to do such a thing, or even that thirst had 
motivated me to do it.” What Nagel points out here, I think, is the fact that desires do not provide us with 
the information of how to satisfy them, they do not tell us what to do – desires, according to this reading of 
Nagel, are practically inefficacious.  See Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, 33-34.  
67 “Deliberation is a process whereby a deliberator arrives at a conclusion--not a process which she directs 
toward the conclusion she favours, prior to deliberating. Prior to deliberating, someone may already favour 
the action she subsequently decides to perform, and this preference may explain her decision. But if 
someone is really deliberating about what to do, then the activity in which she is engaged is not the activity 
of intentionally bringing it about that her decision conforms to her preference.” Buss, What Practical 
Reasoning Must Be, 404. 
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I deliberate and judge that in order for me to quench my thirst I have to go to a vending 
machine and not to an ATM machine. In making a judgment, one recognizes certain 
reasons that lead to the judgment and hence a belief. Whereas I could have believed for a 
while that I ought to run to an ATM machine, I overrule this judgment now by believing 
that I actually ought to run to a vending machine in order to quench my thirst. The 
principle underlying the action of satisfying my thirst-quenching desire would be 
something like this: ‘In order to quench your thirst (sets the end), you ought to go to a 
vending machine and buy a soft drink (practical norm, maxim).’ Therefore we can make 
sense of judgments and judgment-sensitive attitudes possessing the distinctive 
characteristic of the “possibility of overruling and being overruled.”68 This may require 
the overruling of reason A (going-to-the-ATM) by reason B (going-to-the-vending-
machine). Hence, even in the case of a desire, I have to act upon a rationally intelligible 
principle in order to satisfy my desire. 
In the case where the end is fixed by an object of a desire, the determination of the 
maxim to act upon is mediated through a hypothetical imperative. A hypothetical 
imperative is a principle of rationality that “represent(s) the practical necessity of a 
possible action as a means to achieving something else that one wills.”69 If I act to satisfy 
some desire such as thirst, then I will – I judge – to act on a principle that specifies the 
satisfaction of that desire as the goal of my action. What constitutes motivation is hence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 24. 
69 Kant, Groundwork, 4:414. 
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the deliberative process that entails formation of judgments and adoption of principles for 
action.70  
So even in the case of what Nagel calls an “unmotivated desire,”71 my action is not 
simply motivated by that desire, but by the adoption of a principle for action. So, even 
when someone apparently acts out of a brute desire, such as thirst, he acts on a principle 
or a maxim that he adopts accordingly. In the case mentioned above it is the adoption of 
the maxim of going to the vending machine and buying a soft drink in order to quench his 
thirst. This is simply what intentional action entails – actively choosing, or willing, an 
action and hence adopting an underlying maxim that constitutes an action’s principle.  
 
Setting Ends 
So far, the Humean critic might not be too impressed. After all, we have only 
shown how reason can “afford us means of exerting any passion.”72 We have yet to 
explain how reason can set ends independently of desires. Let us consider another case, 
namely that of a desire for future well-being in order to see that we can set ends 
independently of present desires. Whereas it seems completely reasonable to think that 
person A does at time t not possess any specific desire to care for her future welfare – or 
actually possesses an explicit desire not to care about her future welfare – and is thus not 
motivated to act in a certain way, it seems plausible to hold that she will have such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Furthermore, note that the judgment I made is justified in light of my goal. Hence, the practical norm of 
running to the vending machine is justified on the background of my initial aim of quenching my thirst. 
Although these considerations of justification seem trivial here, they will become essential for us later on.  
71 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, 29. 
72 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 459. 
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desire at time t-1 after going through a process of deliberation. After deliberating, the 
person may actually judge that it is good to care for her future welfare. She might 
recognize certain reasons that lead her to the insight that it is actually good to care for her 
future welfare and hence set an end independently of her present set of desires. The desire 
to care for her future welfare is hence derived from this evaluative judgment. To put this 
in ordinary terms, a person can autonomously ‘make up her mind’ independently of any 
present desires she might have at the moment. It should have become clear that I 
understand an evaluative judgment to be constituted by reasons independently of desires. 
The judgment to care for future welfare must be made on the grounds of some 
external normative principle which is not derived from present desires, because its 
reason-giving force is actually contrary to the present desires. 73 Implicit in this argument 
is the rejection of the Humean idea that the only considerations relevant to our reasons for 
action are considerations one already has.74 Quite to the contrary, we can see how 
external reasons, not present in our present belief set, can provide the grounds for 
judgments which determine our decisions and actions. Hence we can approximate the 
Kantian idea that a person can give herself an objective law, insofar as it is this lawgiving 
that defines one’s autonomy. One can set his or her own end by thinking about the issue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For details of this argument and the role of prudence or deliberative capability, see: Nagel, The 
Possibility of Altruism, 33-46. See also Herman, when she argues that “even when we act for the sake of 
desire, desire is not the cause of our action. We act on such principles as desire satisfaction, or even this 
desire-satisfaction, is good. Our adoption of ends always has a principled basis. We act for reasons. 
Evaluative questions concern the adequacy of principles on which we act. The desire that is the occasion of 
a given willing is itself neither good nor bad; desires are not themselves proper objects of evaluation.” 
Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 229. 
74 Buss, What Practical Reasoning Must Be, 407. 
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at hand in the right way.75 As this should make clear, it seems possible for a deliberative 
agent to be motivated to do or desire something on the grounds of evaluative judgments 
that are not caused by some present desire, but by reason. Insofar as person A has now 
adopted a desire to care for her future welfare on the grounds of her evaluative judgment, 
person A might accordingly start eating a more healthy diet. Her desire of eating a more 
healthy diet at some time t-2 in the future was not motivated by an unmotivated desire, 
but rather by her rational judgment. Whereas a present desire caused the person not to 
care about her health and eat an abundance of ice cream every day, the person’s 
deliberative judgment has overturned her present desire and hence her motivation. Thus, 
we see how motivation can shift, according to a belief a person holds. Accordingly, we 
can agree with Buss when she argues that “an agent forms an intention by deliberating 
about what to do, her intention is not something that merely happens in and to her. It is 
something she makes happen, something she plays an active role in producing.”76 
 
Now, we can grasp how categorical imperatives actually apply even in non-moral 
cases, insofar as we understand an imperative to be categorical if the end is adopted 
through our rational will and not through some preexisting desire of ours.77 Having 
established the idea of being able to autonomously set ends, we have established what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Kant, Groundwork, 4:440. Accordingly, Kant states  “The principle of autonomy is, therefore: to choose 
only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition.” 
76 Buss, What practical reasoning must be, 403. My emphasis. 
77 “The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as objectively necessary of itself, 
without reference to another end.” Kant, Groundwork, 4:414. 
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makes us distinct from animal nature, namely our humanity as the capacity to set ends 
through reason, independently of any inclinations.78 
 
Judgment and Motivation 
There seems hence to be a fundamental connection between judging something to 
be a good reason and being motivated to act from this reason. This is what, besides 
others,79  Scanlon points to with his example of judging there to be grounds for holding a 
belief B. According to Scanlon, it is the judgment that explains why one actually holds 
belief B. One does not hold the belief B, because one desires to do so, but because one 
recognizes certain reasons that result in the formation of the judgment. This goes back to 
the point I mentioned above about believing to be in front of the White House and not the 
Eiffel Tower. One does not have to be separately motivated by a desire in order to hold 
belief B, because one simply recognizes the sufficient grounds that lead to the judgment. 
Now let us look at the practical case. As Scanlon states, 
 
“Similarly, a rational person who judges there to be compelling reason to do A 
normally forms the intention to do A, and this judgment is sufficient explanation of 
that intention and of the agent acting on it. There is no need to invoke an additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, 118-119. See also Kant, Groundwork, 4:437: “Rational nature is 
distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an end.” 
79 Another proponent of this view is Nagel, as should have become clear from the above mentioned 
elaborations: “…ordinarily first-personal judgments possess motivational content already…First-person 
judgments about reasons are inherently relevant to decisions about what to do, and they provide the basis 
for justification and criticism of action, and desire – not just of judgments about action and desire.” Nagel, 
The Possibility of Altruism, 110. 
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form of motivation beyond the judgment and the reasons it recognizes, some further 
force to, as it were, get the limbs in motion.”80 
 
When we “adopt an end we form the intention of pursuing it.”81 It is hence a matter 
of our rational agency to make “systematic connections between a person’s judgments 
and his or her subsequent attitudes.”82 From this we can infer that our motives are 
sensitive to judgments. This is precisely the Kantian point. The capacity to form 
judgments plays a fundamental role for Kant’s account of moral motivation. According to 
such a view, we need in “addition to feeling, a preceding (logically, if not temporarily) 
founding judgment and a relevant commitment of volition.”83 I hope that I have explained 
exactly this in the previous sections. Even though Kant does not deny the importance of 
feeling for motivation, this feeling of respect – which is distinct from feelings of pleasure 
and pain – depends on the faculty of reason.  
This should render plausible the idea that judgments lay at the bottom of 
motivation. It is completely sensible that a belief entails some kind of intention, because 
it involves some thought “affirming what is correct, justified, likely to be true, in accord 
with norms, etc.”84 What the Kantian argument ultimately comes down to is that the 
solution to “problem of moral motivation” depends primarily on the recognition of 
reasons. There is then, as Stephen Engstrom is right to point out, a “conceptual 
connection” between recognizing a reason for doing something and the motivation to do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 33-34, my emphasis. 
81 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 53. 
82 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 33. 
83 Ameriks, Kant and Motivational Externalism, 19. My emphasis. 
84 Ameriks, Kant and Motivational Externalism, 12. 
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just that what is recognized to be done.85 Thus, these practical judgments can best be 
understood as ‘ought-judgments’.86 As such, these ought-judgments render imperatives, 
such as Kant’s Categorical Imperative. These imperatives tell us what to do, for example 
that we ought to stop at a red light. The idea behind it is that we as human beings can 
recognize reasons and it is these reasons that can constitute certain motives, as I have 
outlined above. Since one can recognize the reasons to stop at a red light, one can be 
motivated to act accordingly. Insofar as it is these judgments that determine what we 
ought to do and hence move us to do just that, we can understand how we as rational 
agents act freely, and hence from our own will. Therefore, we do not need to appeal to 
some sort of a practical version of the “myth of the given.”87 And hence, I agree with 
Scanlon’s rejection of conceiving of the problem of moral motivation primarily as being 
one of psychology.88 Rather, it is a matter of recognizing certain reasons upon which a 
person then forms a judgment. The problem of moral motivation, traditionally conceived 
then actually ceases to exist. Remember that the traditional problem, as Michael Smith 
presents it, runs as follows: 
 
1. Judgments like (A) ‘It is right to act only on principles that cannot be reasonably 
rejected’ express a person’s practical belief about what it is right to do. 
2. Judgments like (A) motivate one to do (A). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge, 14. 
86 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press 1992), 31. 
87 Ameriks, Kant and Motivational Externalism, 12. 
88 See Hieronymi, Of Metaethics and Motivation, 114. 
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3. Motivation entails the existence of desires, which are distinct – not cognitively 
connected to – from beliefs.89 
 
We should now be in a position to recognize that the problem as stated is misconceived, 
insofar as desires, at least the ones being distinct from or not connected to beliefs, do not 
play any significant role for a plausible account of motivation of rational agents. 
Therefore, we can reject (3). In doing so, we reject the “empiricist’s account of 
motivation” and hence its accompanying picture of human agency.90 
What the aforementioned elaborations should have shown is that human agency is 
unique, insofar as it is rational agency. What makes us persons is our capacity to 
recognize and act for reasons. Contrary to the Humean, we can content that reason is 
quite potent in determining our motives. We can set our own ends and act on rational 
principles even if we aim to satisfy present desires, such as thirst. To put this last point 
differently, we should emphasize that as rational agents we can set ends contrary to 
present desires, based on the recognition of good reasons through our ability to 
reflectively think and evaluate. I furthermore hope to have rendered plausible the idea 
that judgments entail intentions and that no appeal to desires is required in order to give 
an accurate account of human motivation. Thus, we can keep points (1) and (2) and 
consequently dissolve the problem of moral motivation. What remains to be seen, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See Smith, The Moral Problem, 12. 
90 See Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, viii. 
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however, is what kinds of reasons constitute moral requirements. This is the hard problem 
of morality. What are the appropriate moral principles? 
 
Before that it is important, however, to point out that desires might still play a role, 
as they do for Kant. These desires have a different structure than desires on the Humean 
account, insofar as they are principle-dependent and hence of secondary importance, but 
the aspect of some kind of feeling is implicit even with regard to such principle-
dependent desires. Such desires might therefore refer more accurately to some form of 
prudential- or moral emotions that are derived from reason.91  So after all, we might 
concede to the Humean the presence and relevance of desires, but reject the primacy of 
desires for a plausible account of motivation that the Humean ascribes desires to have. 
From the previous elaborations we can infer that reason is not merely a passive 
capacity to discern matters of fact or relations of ideas, as Hume argued, but is instead 
actively engaging with the will by proscribing certain principles for action that eventually 
move me to act accordingly. Implicit on this picture is that action is not caused by brute, 
unreflective, desires, but by the faculty of reason.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 See Carla Bagnoli, Moral emotions and the vocabulary of mutual recognition,   
http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/biblioteca/cxc/public/b/bagnoli1.pdf 2006. 
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6. Moral Motivation 
So far, we have only explained how we act in accordance with self-interested or 
prudential motives. What we have to do in the following is to explain how we can act in 
accordance with normative principles that might be contrary to our self-interest. We have 
to show how we can act in accordance with objective moral principles. Or as Scanlon 
puts it, we have to “spell out how believing an act to be wrong is connected to seeing a 
reason not to perform it.”92  Doing this should explicate how we can act from principles 
that constitute respect between persons. It should further help us to see why the 
contractualist moral principles are the appropriate principles once we accept respect to be 
a fundamental moral notion. 
  In accordance with Kant I argue that a plausible account of practical reason does 
not only entail the idea of “informed pursuit of self-interest”, but also the idea of being 
able to act on principles that might be contrary to our self-interest or desires and which 
apply to us categorically. The principles that are derived from such a categorical 
imperative must be of such a nature that makes them available to every person. 
We have already come across an instance of a categorical imperative in the welfare 
example. There we saw, that autonomous agents are capable of acting on principles that 
are contrary to present desires. They are able to give themselves their own laws which 
need to be followed independently of any inclination. What we have not yet explained, 
however, is the idea that as persons who stand in relations to other persons, we can and 
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actually ought to act from objective principles that can be justified to everyone and hence 
express respect for others.  
 
From Self to the Other  
What we have to do in the following section is to present an argument which carves 
out the moral capacities that we ascribe to rational agents and upon whose grounds we 
formulate certain moral requirements, such as the demand for respect. This brings us to 
the special role of moral agency that makes us persons in the truest sense93 – being able to 
not only act on self-interested reasons, but on reasons that are responsive to certain 
normative principles and hence to other persons as well. To put this in Kantian terms, we 
have to explain how as persons we can act from a moral law and hence be subject to 
certain moral obligations.  
 
What does it mean to be a moral agent? Being a person qua moral agent entails the 
notion of possessing a moral conscience. By this I mean that a person possesses an 
awareness of him- or herself as being one among other equally “self-originating sources 
of valid claims,”94 or so I will argue in the following section. 95 Eventually it should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Wood underlines the distinction between being a person in the sense that one possesses humanity, and 
hence the capacity to act on prudent motives, and being a person in the sense of being a moral agent who 
can adhere to moral principles. Accordingly he argues that “The predisposition to personality is the rational 
capacity to respect the moral law and to act having duty or the moral law as a sole sufficient motive of the 
will.” Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, 118.  
94 John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in: John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel 
Freeman (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999), 303-358, 543. 
95 See Nagel on this point. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, 99f. 
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become clear that the autonomy we ascribe to a person necessarily incorporates what I 
shall call a reciprocity-component. The idea behind it is that persons can actually only 
exercise their autonomy in relation with other autonomous persons who in turn 
acknowledge and constrain one’s exertion of autonomy. This should help us to eventually 
understand what it means to be an autonomous agent, namely an agent that must always 
act only on principles that are justifiable to others. Furthermore, we should then be in a 
position to make sense of the idea that we have certain duties towards others, such as the 
duty to help that applies to us as persons categorically, independently of our desires. But 
let us for now focus on the idea of persons who conceive of themselves as one among 
others in order to better understand what is meant by moral agency. 
 
Let me again begin my presenting some intuitively plausible ideas that should 
prepare us for more technical arguments to follow. The experience of disrespect is only 
possible if there are other persons who can cause this experience. Similarly, the notion of 
self-respect, as Rawls understands it, entails the existence of other persons as sources of 
recognition and reassurance of one’s self-respect. Thus, we can accept the fact that 
persons are always situated in a community of persons with whom we interact. 
Hence, it seems as though we can grasp why as persons, we depend on cooperative 
relations with other persons. If our self-respect is constituted by the acknowledgment of 
other persons, one should be able to see why a certain form of reciprocal relationships 
among persons is to be preferred. It also becomes clear that persons must presuppose the 
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responsiveness to one’s particular situation by others. 96  With this expected 
responsiveness on the one hand comes a sense of accountability on the other hand. What 
do I mean by this? Insofar as I expect the other person to be responsive to my claims, I 
myself must presuppose the same capacity in the other person as well. So far as I hold 
other persons accountable, I must acknowledge their autonomy. In turn, I must 
understand myself to be accountable to other persons as well. Consequently, I must view 
other persons as equally worthy of recognition and hence must see myself as a “moral 
agent in a community of equals.”97  
 
Let us now try to unpack these ideas in steps in order to understand better what 
constitutes our moral agency. Let us return to the concept of self-respect that was 
introduced at the beginning of the thesis. Whereas I focused on Rawls’ description of 
self-respect in the beginning, let me here focus on Kant. Kant states:  
 
“Rational nature exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his own 
existence [as a rational agent] in this way [as an end in itself]; so far it is thus a subjective 
principle of human actions. But every other rational being also represents his existence in this 
way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the same 
time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to 
derive all laws of the will.”98 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 “It is part of the condition of human agency to be in a community of persons, each of whom is regarded 
as free on the same grounds as we regard ourselves free.” See Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 
86. 
97 Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 86. 
98 Kant, Groundwork, 4:429. 
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It seems to me that the grounds for such a representation of oneself must be found in the 
recognition of one’s autonomy and hence one’s capacity to set ends through reason. What 
leads a person to regard herself as an “end in itself” is her rational capacity to 
autonomously self-direct her life. Kant’s idea seems to be that the value one ascribes to 
rational nature in a person, not the particular person itself, is what lets one to adopt self-
respect. This is what constitutes humanity in a person. This is important to emphasize. 
While it may seem as though a person’s self-respect stems from her particular projects 
and interests, one has to realize that these projects and the value thereof are grounded in a 
person’s capacity to autonomously adopt certain projects and interests in the first place. A 
person values her projects, because it was her who chose to adopt them. It is therefore the 
person’s autonomy understood as a “self-originating source(s) of claims”99 or as a 
“nonderivative source of reasons”100 that needs to be respected. This is in accordance 
with Kant who claims “Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature 
and of every rational nature.”101 
 
Insofar as every person conceives of herself as and “end in itself,” every person 
represents herself as possessing “an inner worth, that is, dignity”102 and hence the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 543. 
100 T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press 2008), 92. 
101 Kant, Groundwork, 4: 436. 
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understanding of being respect worthy.103  Consequently, every person expects and 
demands a certain kind of treatment from other persons; namely that kind of treatment 
which acknowledges one’s dignity. This entails the idea that a person never wants to be 
treated as a mere instrument to the fulfillment of another person’s ends. Accordingly, 
Kant holds that all “rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks 
them out as an end in itself, that is, something that may not be used merely as a means, 
and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect).”104 We can then get a grasp 
of what it means to treat someone merely as a means, namely to deny him or her the 
equal authority of his or her claims. This is how I understand treating someone as a mere 
means – namely not taking the reasons of another person into consideration at the same 
level as one’s own reasons. Hence, the concept of dignity – for a person to be an end in 
itself – does imply the equal validity and authority of claims or demands of a person with 
regard to every fellow person.105  Respecting the claims and demands of the other, which 
includes certain kinds of reasons, ultimately respects the dignity of the other. 
From this we can infer that being an autonomous agent, who conceives of herself 
as respect worthy, presupposes the responsiveness of others to one’s claims and hence 
their capacity to recognize certain constraints or limits upon their own reasons for action. 
I will further elaborate on this thought in the following section.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See also Rawls’s reconstruction of Kant’s argument for an end in itself. John Rawls, Lectures on the 
History of Moral Philosophy, Barbara Herman (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000), 
196-197. 
104  Kant, Groundwork, 4:428. 
105 See Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 244. 
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Mutual Accountability 
What we need to do now is to extend the Kantian idea of autonomy and consider 
its further implications. To do so, I will mainly draw on Fichtean arguments developed by 
Stephen Darwall.106 Insofar as person A demands respect for her autonomous being, 
person A ascribes the other person B responsibility for his compliance or non-compliance 
with this demand. This seems intuitively plausible. Think of the example I mentioned at 
the very beginning of the thesis with regard to the experience of disrespect. One feels 
disrespected or wronged, because the other person did not take his or her foot off one’s 
own foot. The disrespect is grounded in the fact that one took the other person to be 
responsive to one’s demand and hence responsible for his decision not to take of the foot 
and thus to comply with one’s demand.107 It is a conceptual truth of a demand that the 
person addressed must be responsiveness to this very demand. Or to put it in more 
general terms, someone who lays a claim on someone else must presuppose 
responsiveness to the claim by the other person. Now, let us see what the presuppositions 
and consequences of this idea are.  
What does the responsiveness of others to my claims presuppose? It presupposes 
that others must share a platform with me, which allows me to lay claims on them in the 
first place. Insofar as I lay claims on other persons through second-personal address108 by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint. 
107  See Darwall on that point. He states that “any second-personal reason you implicitly address, 
presupposes, first, that he can recognize the validity of your demand and, second, that he can move his foot 
simply by recognizing a conclusive reason for acting deriving from your authoritative demand.” Darwall, 
The Second-Person Standpoint, 76.  
108 I am borrowing this term from Stephen Darwall’s elaborations on the Second-Personal Standpoint. See 
Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint. 
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giving certain reasons, I must presuppose the capacity in others to respond to these 
reasons accordingly. Therefore, I must presuppose the same rational capacities, which 
enable me to give reasons, in the other person as well. The shared platform must hence be 
the space of practical reasons, to which every person has access through their rational 
capacity. Only if I presuppose this shared space of practical reason can I expect the other 
person to recognize my reasons to be of normative significance for her. 
It follows from this that I must presuppose autonomy in the other person; the 
capacity to recognize external, or in this case other-regarding, reasons and to be able to 
will to act accordingly. Only if I view the other person as an autonomous agent with 
similar deliberative capacities who can recognize certain normative reasons, can I ascribe 
the other person responsibility for compliance or non-compliance with my demands.109  
 
Now, let us consider an important consequence of the aforementioned ideas. If I 
expect others to be responsive to my claims, based on our common rational capacities, I 
must presuppose the capacity of other’s to lay claims on me and in turn hold me 
responsible to respond to their claims accordingly. From this we can infer that I can only 
demand respect from someone else, if I at the same time acknowledge the equal dignity 
of the other person.110 Hence I must regard the other person as an equally valid source of 
claims. Only then can I assume the other person to be responsive to my claims.111 We 
must mutually recognize each other’s equal standing. Implicit in this claim is the idea that 	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we a person has the capacity to “put oneself in another’s shoes.”112 This is what Darwall 
refers to as the “second-personal authority” that we “share” as “free and rational 
beings.”113 Every person is hence in a position to demand or lay claims on another 
person.  
A person must consequently view herself as one agent in a “community of 
equals.”114 Insofar as every person recognizes the authority of the other person, it follows 
that one cannot only hold others morally responsible, but also must hold oneself to be 
morally responsible as well. Thus we can render plausible the idea that persons stand in 
normative relations to one another. Since persons hold each other accountable, they can 
demand certain conduct from one another.115 Therefore, mutual accountability among 
persons ultimately grounds moral obligations that we have towards each other as 
person.116 What do I mean by this? To put things quite simple: As much as I can ask for 
justification of someone’s reasons for action, which enables me to consequently accept or 
denounce these reasons, the other can do the same with regard to my reasons for action. 
Some reasons, even though justified on subjective grounds, might not be justifiable, 
because they undermine the dignity of other persons. As Darwall puts it:  
 
“In the reciprocal recognition of the second-person standpoint, addresser and 
addressee are committed alike to their mutual accountability as equal free 
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114 Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 86. 
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and rational persons, and this commits them to the demand for justification to 
one another, at least within the scope of their mutual accountability.” 
 
Now that I have explained how persons are aware of themselves as simply one 
among many ends in a “kingdom of ends,”117 insofar as they take themselves to be 
accountable to other persons, we can make sense of the idea that only certain reasons for 
action are legitimate or authoritative, namely principles that mediate mutual recognition 
and respect among persons. It follows that as persons we ought to only act on reasons that 
are mutually acceptable. One cannot simply act on any principles, but must at the same 
time see oneself as legislating principles for the “kingdom of ends.”118  This refers to the 
idea that insofar as we want others to respond to our reasons in a certain way, namely by 
acknowledging their validity and normativity, we ourselves must give reasons that others 
cannot reasonably reject. As such it the Kantian idea of “a systematic union of rational 
beings through common objective laws.”119 And it is through these laws that our relation 
to one another as moral agents is determined. Hence we can make sense of the categorical 
imperative, stated as the Formulation of the Universal Law, as a moral requirement that 
originates from these interpersonal relations and can be justified to other persons: “act 
only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
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become a universal law.”120 The universal law or “universal imperative” applies to 
everyone as members of an inescapable moral community. 
 
In this section I hope to have explained that a person as a rational agent, who lays 
claims on others and demands respect for herself, has to view himself at the same time as 
a moral agent, insofar as laying claims on others commits herself to the equal dignity and 
authority of everyone as well as to mutual accountability. Every person must possess 
moral conscience, the awareness to be one among many other persons with equal moral 
status. As Darwall states 
 
“…we must assume that they (persons) have access to  a source of reasons simply in 
being rational wills who are apt for second-personal address…It follows that we 
must assume autonomy of the will…”121 
 
Along the way it should have become clear that this section was as much concerned with 
the nature of moral principles as it was with the delineation of moral agency. Not only is 
moral agency constituted interpersonally, so too are moral principles. Moral principles of 
right are those which can be justified to every person and as such mediate respect.122 
Those are exactly the principles Kantian contractualism appeals to, insofar as 
contractualism is at base concerned with interpersonal relations and its accompanying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Kant, Groundwork, 4:421. 
121 Darwall, The Second-Personal Standpoint, 275. 
122 Darwall underlines exactly this point by claiming that “It is a hallmark of contractualist theories that 
they hold principles of right to have a distinctive role, namely, as mediating relations of mutual respect.” 
See Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 301. 
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concepts of accountability and respect.123 Hence, these principle express concern for 
“what we owe to each other, ” insofar as it is respect that we owe to each other124 A 
person can cognize these moral principles through her understanding of herself as a moral 
agent, an end in itself among many other ends in a kingdom of ends, who is able to 
recognize normative reasons through her encounter with other persons.  
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Moral Judgments 
Now that we have established the idea of persons as moral agents in addition to 
the motivational basis of rational agents found in reason, we can make sense of moral 
deliberation. To deliberate as a moral agent, as a person with moral conscience, means to 
judge whenever reasons are good reasons on the grounds of one’s membership in the 
moral community. Eventually, this should render plausible the idea that as moral agents 
we ought to act on principles that can be justified to every person around us.  
As I mentioned before, the underlying idea is that persons share the space of 
practical reasons and as such an equal validity and authority of claims or demands with 
regard to fellow persons. 125  This is what Darwall points to when he argues, 
“dignity…includes, I maintain, an irreducibly second-personal authority to demand 
respect for this very authority.”126 This value or dignity –which constitutes an end in itself 
– is a “nonderivative source of reasons” for everyone, as Scanlon puts it.127 Respecting 
the claims and demands of the other, which includes certain kinds of reasons, ultimately 
respects the dignity of the other. Thus, it is on the basis of the space of practical reasons 
that persons share with each other that they have obligations towards each other.  
 
Since the preceding sections have made explicit that to be a person ultimately 
entails to be a moral agent, we can grasp how autonomy in the case of prudence is only 
exercised partially, because it does not fully express our personality. We can refer to this 	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kind of autonomy also as rational autonomy.128 Hence it mirrors our capacity to set ends 
with regard to our “highest-order interests.”129 
Quite contrary to this notion of autonomy, one exercises full autonomy once he 
realizes his status as inevitably one among many ends in a kingdom of ends. As such, 
one’s full autonomy entails the capacity to act on reasons that are responsive to the claims 
of other person. Thus, a moral person must understand oneself as “identical with a 
particular, impersonally specifiable inhabitant of the world, among others with a similar 
nature.”130  
Now, recall that acting autonomously entails the notion of acting from a law that a 
person gives herself. If we accept the claim that a person’s full autonomy entails a 
second-personal awareness, we can make sense of the idea that an autonomous agent can 
act only from laws that recognize this second-personal awareness. Otherwise put, an 
autonomous agent must understand himself to be a “free and equal moral person”131 
among other persons who is responsible and hence accountable for his actions towards 
others. As a consequence, one must act from a law that acknowledges these facts.  
Therefore, I argue that our autonomy entails an inevitable reciprocity-component, 
or as Darwall would put it, a second-personal component.132 To be autonomous then 
means to necessarily stand in responsive relations to others and to exercise one’s rational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 I am drawing on the distinction between rational and full autonomy that John Rawls famously put 
forward in his lectures on Kantian constructivism. Therein he states that rational autonomy “roughly 
parallels Kant’s notion of hypothetical imperatives.” See Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 
521. 
129 Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 528. 
130 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, 100. 
131 Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 532. 
132 Darwall, The Second-Personal Standpoint, 275. 
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capacities against the background of this responsiveness. Or otherwise put, one’s 
autonomy is exercised against the background of one’s moral conscience. Whereas the 
prudent person exercises his autonomy against the background of his personal needs and 
interest, and asks himself what he ought to do to buy himself a nice car, the moral agent 
exercises his autonomy against the background of his moral conscience, his awareness of 
the dignity of others around him, and accordingly asks himself what he ought to do in 
order to respect the other person, or so I argue.  
Insofar as we have seen that moral principles are constituted by the mutual 
recognition among persons, it should become clear that to judge a reason to be a good 
reason entails the justifiableness of that reason to every other person. It follows that as 
moral agents we evaluate our own reasons in the light of external normative principles 
that originate from the relationships we stand in as moral agents. This is what it means to 
exercise reasonableness, namely to be able to ‘step back’;133 to evaluate one’s subjective 
reasons with regard to the moral law – to principles that everyone can agree to. Hence, 
reasonableness, as mirroring our moral conscience, expresses “our motivation as persons 
in caring about…constraints.”134 Therefore, when we appeal to the categorical imperative 
as moral agents, this moral imperative tells us to act on maxims that no one can 
reasonably reject or which we can will as universal laws. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 See Ameriks, who makes this point explicit with regard to Kant’s overall ‘strategy’: “…, the moral agent 
can understand that it can step back from both its feelings and these beliefs and ask what it is that, 
everything considered, it ought to do…” Ameriks, Kant and Motivational Externalism, 13. 
134 Rawls, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, 241. 
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From this, I argue, we can infer that our prudential motives or highest-order 
interests have to be subordinated to objective reasons that originate within the moral 
community or union, because we eventually realize that other persons share an equal 
moral status with us. Although we have established moral agency on the grounds of 
rational agency, namely by mutually recognizing each other’s rational agency, it is our 
moral agency, which is expressed by our reasonableness, that “subordinates” mere 
rational agency.”135 
If we understand full autonomy to entail this social dimension than we can make 
sense of Kant’s account of morality: 
 
“Morality is thus the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to a 
possible giving of universal law through its maxims. An action that can coexist with 
autonomy of the will (second-personal autonomy) is permitted; one that does not 
accord with it is forbidden.”136 
 
Insofar as moral agents have access to certain normative principles that constitute 
the moral law, they always ought to act on this law. This is what it means to fully govern 
oneself. I entails the idea of being able to ask ‘What ought I to do?’, to reflect upon one’s 
reasons for actions, and to deliberate accordingly. As we have already seen, evaluative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135  See Rawls, who argues for this point in the context of his Kantian constructivism: “The Reasonable 
presupposes the Rational, because, without conceptions of the good that move members of the group, there 
is no point to social cooperation nor to notions of right and justice, even though such cooperation realizes 
values that go beyond what conceptions of the good specify taken alone. The Reasonable subordinate the 
Rational because its principles limit, and in a Kantian doctrine limit absolutely, the final ends that can be 
pursued.” Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 530. 
136 Kant, Groundwork, 4:439. 
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judgments are an essential part of our practical thinking. Similarly, they are essential to 
our moral thinking. We judge certain reasons to be good reasons, insofar as they are 
reasons no one can reject. And as we have seen in the non-moral cases, we form 
intentions on the basis of these judgments. 
Accordingly, to “assert” a moral judgment is to imply that there are objective 
reasons upon whose grounds the judgment can be justified to a community of persons.137 
Thus, when what Rawls calls the “CI-procedure” 138  is applied to the process of 
deliberation, against the background of one’s moral conscience, the CI-procedure must 
render moral imperatives, such as the Formulation of Humanity: “So act that you use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same 
time as an end, never merely as a means.”139 Insofar as we have already elaborated on the 
practicality of judgments it should become clear that our motivation to act in accordance 
with moral principles similarly does not “rest at all on feelings, impulses, and inclinations 
but merely on the (recognition of the) relation of rational beings to one another.”140 
Insofar as a person who possesses self-respect demands a certain conduct from others, 
she must eventually hold herself to be morally responsible as well. As such, and insofar 
as a person is a rational agent that can recognize certain reasons, a person can judge to act 
on certain reasons and not others. In short, our motivation to act from moral principles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, 245. 
138 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, 167-170. According to Rawls the CI-procedure has 
four steps: A subject’s maxim at with the first step, a generalization of the maxim with the second step, a 
transformation of the general maxim into a law of nature with the third step, and finally an integration of 
the “as-if law of nature at step (3) to the existing laws of nature.”  
139 Kant, Groundwork, 4:429. 
140 Kant, Groundwork, 4:434. 
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derives from evaluative judgments we make as moral agents. Or otherwise put, our 
obligation to act in accordance with moral principles depends on our capacity to 
deliberate as moral agents; it depends on the capacity of a person to recognize certain 
reasons as authoritative, namely reasons that constitute respectful relations among 
persons.  
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Part III 
7. Humean Moral Motivation Revisited 
As I stated at above, it should be clear that if we want to make sense of certain 
categorical moral obligations that originate from interpersonal relations, we have to reject 
a Humean account of moral motivation. The Humean theory cannot account for these 
obligations, because on such view we are not necessarily responsive to the other person. 
All we find on the Humean account is what I call a ‘moral want’; not in any sense a 
‘moral ought’. Let me briefly elaborate on this in the following to strengthen some of the 
arguments mentioned earlier.  
It is after all possible that we understand something to be the right thing to do – 
that it ought to be done – and yet decide not to do it.141 This should make clear that the 
moral ‘ought’ looses its substance if what we ought to do is what we feel like doing or are 
determined to do by any natural causes. Insofar as what we feel like doing, or what we 
desire or have interest in, serves as an immediate reason to do it, we do not need 
something else to give us a reason for doing it. But as moral requirements can demand 
our compliance, put duties before our eyes, even though we feel like doing something 
else, it should become clear that the moral ‘ought’ cannot be grounded in desires and 
feelings, but must present itself in form of reasons and principles that we are able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See also Ameriks who states “Moral laws tell us what must be done – but only if we are moral beings, 
and the praise and blame that Kant insists that we properly assign to agents presupposes that we think of 
them as freely choosing how they act (so the ‘moral must’ is not a ‘causal must’).” Ameriks, Kant and 
Motivational Externalism, 15. 
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adhere to, independently of any present desires. After all, we are as moral agents able to 
ask ourselves what we should do and not only what we want or would like to do. Being 
faced with the moral ‘ought’ entails the notion of facing two or more alternative action-
guiding options or reasons from one of which has to be chosen. Reasons and principles 
that constitute the moral ‘ought’ are derived from reason and not from mere desires. As 
Heiner Klemme is right to point out, we must hence envision reason to be a causal faculty 
sui generis.142 Accordingly Kant emphasizes that “‘Ought’ expresses a kind of necessity 
and of connection with grounds which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature…It is 
just absurd to ask what ought to happen in the natural world as to ask what properties a 
circle ought to have.”143 
 From this, it should become clear that traditional desire-based accounts of moral 
motivation miss the point with regard to the moral ‘ought’. If we take desires to be mere 
psychological states, it would be similarly absurd to expect these psychological states to 
tell us what ought to happen. Motivation in the practical realm should not be confused 
with causal determination, as would be the case if we base motivation on feelings or 
desires. Hence, Hume’s attempt to reduce the ground of moral ‘ought’ to psychological 
states must fail, insofar as the ‘ought’ is reduced to a mere ‘want’. 144 Acting in 
accordance with the moral law is in the end a matter of our choice that in turn depends on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Heiner F. Klemme, Praktische Gruende und Moralische Motivation. Eine deontologische Perspektive, 
in: Heiner F Klemme, and Manfred Kuehn, and Dieter Schoenecker (ed.), Moralische Motivation, Kant und 
die Alternativen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 2006), 113-153, 124. 
143 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A547/B575. 
144 Klemme makes a similar point, when he argues that Hume’s reductionism aims to explain the moral 
‘ought’ in terms of a moral ‘want’,which eventually leads to the disappearance of the moral ‘ought’ 
altogether. See Klemme, Praktische Gruende und Moralische Motivation. Eine deontologische Perspektive, 
125. 
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our freedom. Since our freedom is embedded in our autonomy and the latter entails the 
notion of acting for reasons one recognizes independently of one’s desires, we can grasp 
that the moral ought does originate from within reason. From this we can further infer 
that we as human beings are fully autonomous only if reason is at the same time the 
principium dijudicationis – determines what is morally right and wrong – and the 
principium executionis which eventually motivate us to act.145  
Humeans can argue that one can develop a certain moral sentiment, namely 
sympathy. But as I have pointed out before, persons do not have to possess this 
sentiment. And even if they do possess it, it does not necessarily outweigh other existing 
desires. Hence, it is more than likely that on the classical Humean version of motivation, 
interests of others or the demands they make upon others possess only relative 
motivational efficacy. We cannot make sense of categorical obligations towards others on 
the classical Humean account, unless one possesses the relevant desire. The outlook for 
any morality grounded in recognition respect and its accompanying universal principles is 
then rather bleak, because on the Humean account presented we cannot appeal to such 
universal moral principles as grounds for reasons for actions, unless everyone possesses 
the same desire to act upon those principles.  
On the view I am defending in this paper, a process of reasoning – moral 
deliberation – that can take external reasons as its input constitutes moral agency. A 
persons can at all times respond to certain reasons of other persons without having to 
possess any desire or feeling, like sympathy. Only on such an account can we make sense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Klemme, Praktische Gruende und Moralische Motivation. Eine deontologische Perspektive, 126. 
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of the moral ‘ought’ and its force. Desires, on the other hand, can “give us no reason to 
accept or recognize moral claims in their own terms.”146 On the Humean account, persons 
are only responsive to their desires and hence only to subjective maxims. They lack moral 
agency and hence humanity – the ability to reason, think as well as to be morally sensible 
and make moral judgments.147 Acting on desires in the traditional sense does not 
constitute the kind of consideration that judgment-sensitive attitudes, such as respect, 
express, because of their unreflective nature. Reasons, on the other hand, can be 
“responsive to the situation of others”,148 insofar as they constitute reflective elements of 
our practical thinking upon which we judge to act in a certain way.  
The only feeling that the Kantian view I am defending here can account for is the 
feeling of respect for the moral law.149 Unlike feelings or desires on the Humean account, 
this feeling is principle-dependent and not object-dependent.150 Hence, this feeling of 
respect is itself grounded in reason and our capacity to deliberate. Thus, this feeling is 
itself never the source of moral motivation. Moral motivation cannot rest on a desire that 
“could be sustained independently of judgment.”151   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 317. 
147 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, 192. 
148 See Ashford, and Mulgan, Contractualism.  
149 See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, And Other Practical Writings in Moral Philosophy, Lewis 
White Beck (ed.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1949). See Chapter III on the Incentives of 
Pure Practical Reason, 180.  
150 See Freeman, Contractualism, 299. 
151 Freeman, Contractualism, 300. 
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8. Vindicating Contractualism 
Let us now return to the problems of contractualism that I outlined in the early 
stages of the thesis. Recall that critics of contractualism have objected that contractualist 
principles lack authority, insofar as they only apply to people who are committed to the 
contractualist ideals. This was referred to as the problem of scope. Implicit in this 
objection is the acceptance of the Humean theory of moral motivation, or so I argued.  
As my elaborations on moral motivation should have made clear, a problem of 
moral motivation does not exist if we take a closer look at human agency. Insofar as 
persons are self-conscious rational beings, an appeal to desires, as the basis of motivation, 
seems to be utterly mistaken. Even in cases where a person’s action seems to be guided 
by a desire, such as thirst, it is a mistake to think that. As rational agents we adopt certain 
maxims in order to satisfy our desires. We adopt plans, so to speak, upon which we 
consequently act. Furthermore, insofar as we have an awareness of and thus an interest in 
our future, we are able to set ends independently of present desires. We judge certain 
principles to be good principles and hence we act upon them. Therefore, we were able to 
render plausible the idea that as rational agents we form intentions based on evaluative 
judgments. 
Now, there was another problem with regard to contractualism. In fact it is not a 
particular problem of contractualism, but of any moral theory. What makes us belief that 
certain moral principle, in this case the contractualist principles, are the correct moral 
principles? In order to vindicate the contractualist principles I elaborated on the personal 
	  	  
66	  
relationships we presuppose as persons with a sense of self-respect and accompanying 
expectations of conduct from others. Hence, I argued that persons, who lay claims on 
others, must eventually ascribe the same capacity to other persons as well. Therefore, a 
person must view herself as a responsible member of a moral community and as such 
able to recognize certain normative principles; namely principles that can be justified to 
every person, insofar as one demands justification of certain principles from other 
persons as well. As we can see here, these principles are exactly the principles of Kantian 
contractualism:152 Act only in accordance with principles that no one can reasonably 
reject. 
Insofar as a person qua moral agent has access to these moral principles by means 
of his or her autonomy, a person is able to exhibit her deliberative capacities accordingly. 
Hence, when someone judges whether a reason is a good reason, he or she must do so 
against the background of her moral conscience. A person, qua moral agent, must exhibit 
her full autonomy, which in turn renders moral categorical imperatives, such as the 
imperative to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it become a universal law”153 for the moral community in which he or 
she is necessarily embedded. 
We are now in a position to see how the problem of motivation is closely connected 
with that of content, or subject matter.154 We should be able to grasp that it is in the end a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 “By presupposing the equal dignity of persons, it commits us to contractualism’s deepest idea: a 
community of mutually accountable free and rational persons.” See Darwall, The Second-Person 
Standpoint, 320. 
153 Kant, Groundwork, 4:421. 
154	  See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 147. 
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matter of discerning moral reasons and that the problem of motivation is actually the 
problem of recognizing principles, in this case of contractualism.  
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9. Conclusion 
 The thesis began with the question what implications respect as a fundamental 
moral notion would have for moral theory. I argued that we consequently would have to 
accept Kantian contractualism, as outlined in T.M. Scanlon’s work. After all, 
contractualism’s fundamental concern is with respect. According to such a theory, we can 
only act on principles that are justifiable to every person. We thereby express respect for 
each individual. After having explained how we can avoid objections with regard to the 
scope of contractualism by rejecting Humean theories of motivation, upon which the 
objections ultimately seem to be based, we should now be in a position to conclude that 
we can vindicate contractualism against objections from scope. It should have become 
clear that as rational agents we can form intentions based on judgments and as such need 
not appeal to any further theory of motivation. It is ultimately reason, and not any desires, 
that provide us with motives.   
Furthermore, it should have become clear that the contractualist moral principles 
are the appropriate moral principles, once we accept respect to be a fundamental moral 
notion. Since persons, qua moral agents, stand in responsive relations to each other, they 
must act on principles that are justifiable to other persons, because it is only in this way 
that they express respect for the other. Since persons, qua moral agents, realize their 
reciprocal standing, we can make sense of the idea that a person’s autonomy entails a 
reciprocity component, which enables a moral agent to deliberate against the background 
of one’s moral conscience and form motives accordingly. The picture of moral agency 
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defended in the thesis should accordingly help us to see the force of contractualist moral 
theory, once we accept respect to be a fundamental moral notion and its implications of 
having obligations towards others. It should also have become clear that a Humean theory 
is insufficient to account for these obligations, since all we get on such a theory is what I 
called a ‘moral want’ and in no sense a ‘moral ought’. The latter can only be arrived at 
through reason of a moral agent in the Kantian sense. 
It is only on a view of moral agency based in reason that allows us to make sense 
of categorical obligations or duties we have towards each other. Such duties cannot “rest 
at all on feelings, impulses, and inclinations but merely on the relation of rational beings 
to one another.”155  
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